Defence, Public Interest and/or Consensus: Limitations and Possibilities

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Dear readers,

It is with great pleasure that the RACVIAC - Centre for Security Cooperation publishes its first Compendium. The decision to publish the RACVIAC Compendium coincides with the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the foundation of the RACVIAC - Centre for Security Cooperation.

The Compendium represents a written history of topics and issues that were discussed during RACVIAC's activities and provides speakers and lecturers with a venue to leave a permanent record of their respective lectures given at RACVIAC.

Being an academic organization, RACVIAC encourages all lecturers and speakers to contribute to the Compendium when taking part in our activities, providing institutional memory and reference for the future.

I sincerely believe that the publishing of this first Compendium, and others in the future, will contribute to the RACVIAC mission of fostering dialogue and cooperation among the member countries and their partners.

RACVIAC Director

Ambassador Branimir Mandić

Introduction

Dear readers,

The first RACVIAC Compendium respresents the fulfillment of an idea that has been on the table at the Centre for Security cooperation for a few years. Contributing to the academic dimension of the RACVIAC - Centre for Security Cooperation, its aim is to provide a tangible form of institutional memory that may be reffered to in the future during the development and conduct of RACVIAC activities. It will also provide an insight into RACVIAC activity for readers that may not have had the opportunity to attend a given activity or may have an interest in a given subject matter.

During the development of the Compendium speakers and lecturers at RACVIAC activities were encouraged to provide written works that addressed the subject matter of their respective lectures. Although this first Compendium covers a period spanning more than the last year, it is the intention of RACVIAC to publish its Compendium annually.

The Compendium has been divided into three sections representing the pillars within the RACVIAC - Centre for Security Cooperation: Cooperative Security Environment with focus on arms control, Security Sector Reform, and International and Regional Cooperation with focus on Euroatlantic integration. Each article has been listed under the respective pillar that organized the activity in which the lecturer/speaker (author) participated.

It is my sincere hope that the RACVIAC Compendium will provide interesting reading for experts involved in security related issues throughout the region and that this Compendium will prove to be usefull beyond the premises of the RACVIAC - Centre for Security Cooperation.

RACVIAC Deputy Director

Brigadier General Zdravko Jakop

Defence, Public Interest and/or Consensus: Limitations and Possibilities

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Introduction

Recently we have witnessed a revival of interest shown for military and defence issues. This phenomenon can be observed on two levels: the global level - followed by dramatic remarks concerning the tectonic disturbances in the geo-strategic theater, and at the national, Croatian level through the extensively exploited topic regarding the future of the Croatian Air Forces. However, the increased public interest reflects the daily political inputs; it is not the result of substantial changes in the attitude of citizens towards the formulation and implementation of public policies, or increased awareness of the problems of modern societies. Therefore, one cannot speak of a different positioning of defence as one of the policy areas in relation to other public policies, nor does it present the reevaluation of defence issues in society - it shows an increased level of forms which are primarily determined by highly emotional patterns used in approaching these issues. Such an increase of public interest is generally inversely proportional to the relevance of the topic involved. The main reason for this is found in the over-simplification of the issues and their arbitrary and superficial contextualization.

The prerequisite for identifying a repositioning of defence in a society still amounts to the volume of mythical, dogmatic material that we are ready to give up on. Consequently, the main issue is not the quantity of the defence themes represented in the public media space but wether defence gained a policy status as is the case for example with the area of health, public administration, the judiciary, etc. or wether they only represent a surrogate for public policy.

This paper examines the position of defence in modern societies, with special reference to the European post-communist societies; discusses the attitude of the society towards defence, especially the civil-military relations issues. The basic idea is that defence and civil-military relations must be understood beyond the dominant discourse in which the majority of issues in this area are being reduced to relations pertaining to political power.

Defence and civil-military relations are a very good indicator of the overall democratic consolidation of modern societies. The moment when defence will be predominantly understood as a policy, rather than as politics we will have created the proper conditions for the appropriate attitude of society towards defence and the optimal level of consensus.

Defence as a Policy Issue

Is defence, therefore, at all public policy? If we take as a criterion meeting the needs and community interest, there is no doubt that defence should be treated as policy. To feel protected and secure is one of the basic needs of the people, citizens and communities. When it comes to its formulation and

implementation, defence is relatively distant from policy if one takes into account the influence criterion of the policy stakeholders (in the broadest sense of the word). Policy stakeholders, who are not part of the national management mechanism, especially those who operate within its horizontal dimensions, have been excluded from the overall policy cycle to the extent that is unparalleled to any other public policy.

There are three key reasons for such a positioning of defence or defence policy in the society:

1. Defence Policy is still highly militarized; Defence is conceptually identified with the Military, which, as a consequence, has implications in the area of management; it focuses defence mainly in the zone of the state and beyond the reach of the society and the area of defence policy gets a dose of mystification inherent to a military organization;
2. Consequently, the Armed Forces, as one of the mechanisms for the implementation of the policy, becomes a policy stakeholder (also within the vertical dimension of the policy);
3. Civil defence managers do not have the required level of expertise to position the defence as public policy and, therefore, this void is filled by military expertise provided by the military structure. Citizens are not seen as policy stakeholders but as objects of that policy.

In fact, the issue of consensus in the field of defence raises the question of how society relates to defence and security and its awareness or need to examine this relationship. In modern Europe we can observe two parallel processes: one where the society shows below-average interest in defence issues and the one where periodical intensified interest in defence is shown, induced by daily political content, filled with superficial and irrelevant topics. In both processes, consensus is not relevant. Consensus in Western societies is generally perceived as a value that contributes to peace and stability in human relationships, promotes cooperation and understanding but also reduces competitiveness and, thus, development. Consensus and indifference can easily go hand in hand. In order to avoid such a situation consensus should derive from a deep understanding of social processes and the implications they bring. To make this possible, state management structures are required to manage the defence sector taking into account the content, specificity and the importance of defence.

Historical Context of Understanding the Military Phenomenon

Understanding of the military segment of defence policy, or, moreover, civil-military relations, is opening the way to withdraw from the dogmatic approach to defence and to liberate it from mystification.

During its historical development, the military as an institution has undergone many transformations. Independently of their significance and proportions, it is worth saying that changes have been a constant characteristic of its historical duration. In that regard, three key points concerning military transition can be distinguished. Each of them is denoted with new concepts and requirements in relation to military organization and its mission. So, in the late 18th century, concurrently with the social and political changes that were given impetus by the American and French revolution, the idea of modern mass (national) military was born. The basic premise of this concept was conscription of the citizens for the purpose of defence of their nation-state.

The idea of mass military was widely accepted, particularly after 1870 and eventually adopted at the time of both World Wars. This model that had prevailed for a long time underwent a deep metamorphosis during the Cold War.

At the end of the Cold War the modern mass military entered a transition process that has changed its organization, the purpose of its existence and is called the post-modern armed force. That is the beginning of expansion of the military's domestic role that now includes assistance in disasters as well as a series of functions connected with lawfulness, social order and governmental organizational system that has automatically brought changes as regards civil-military relations too. These changes will certainly lead to the question whether the military should outgrow its role as a deterrent force or whether it should be a force for constructive change at home or abroad.

Generally, numerous references in literature associated with military issues could be divided into two groups: one that refers to the narrative of the military in the social and political context (including its foreign policy and the internal policy function) and the other relating to military expertise (in terms of overall knowledge, skills and many more elements the military organization possesses, builds, or aims to build). A somewhat paradoxical conclusion could be drawn from that fact. We can almost unanimously agree about the military being a government institution that to the fullest extent personifies the essence of the modern state, which is completely monopolized by the state, and that in most of the countries has a special and highly idealized and emotionalized status; however, the same society is much less involved in studying this phenomenon, but, this is the case with many other phenomena. There are much more serious and relevant researches conducted not only on the military but also on its position in the wider social and political context, created under the auspices of that very same military, rather than in the other areas.

The key challenges for the military organization, and even more so for their managers and the social environment are not in the political or military institution-building, not even in mastering technological capabilities and their application for military purposes; the challenge is by no means defined by the number of troops and the corresponding weapons. The key challenges are in understanding the phenomenon of the military and its functions and in using this basis to build appropriate relationships and management processes. To respond to this challenge a lot more is needed than just declarative siding with the liberal-democratic tradition. It will not be achieved through any organizational changes in the military, nor a generous military budget, nor through attractive political messages for military "ears". The only way to deal with these challenges is by breaking the existing dogmas and myths.

The Military and Democracy

In modern Western democratic countries the central point of deliberation on civil-military relations is the question of having an efficient and well-balanced control. This type of control fits the liberal model. The liberal model avoids two unfavorable/antagonistic scenarios: militarization of society due to insufficient and /or ineffective control and the politicization of the military due to excessive control.

Nevertheless, apolitical military in democracies should not be taken quite literally, at least for two reasons:

- Military professionalization is followed by the growing overlap of strategy and politics and, therefore,

the role of a modern military officer includes many political aspects, requiring training in order to be able to deal with complex political and strategic issues (Abrahamson, 1971: 13);

- The policy - making must take into account the interests of the military. In liberal democracies the Armed Forces present a powerful institutional interest; for example, senior officers of the American Army use their positions and knowledge at the National Security Council and the Congress to secure a bigger defence budget.[1]

In those new circumstances, a mission change in the military organization and with that of the officers' role has driven to intermingling of the military and political issues. An officer is forced to deal with complex politico - strategic issues and, therefore, military professionalization has caused one undesired but necessary consequence instead of separating officers from politics, it has driven to merging of the military and political roles. However, such political roles of the professional officers does not mean disruption of the concept of political neutrality. In some ordinary democratic context, a demand that a professional soldier is above politics implies his/her lack of connection with political parties and inexpressible affiliation to a political party. However, that party neutrality does not mean an apolitical attitude, particularly not in the part in which the mentioned new officer's role also includes a political role (e.g. advisory) (Smerić, 2005: 458). Therefore, we could say that only when bounds are crossed of such «political» engagement in participation in politics that would not be a result of the governmental regulation and institutionalization but of an autonomous decision of the military élite would represent an unallowed political involvement of the military. Only such an engagement would represent a disruption of the norm of political neutrality and Huntington warns that such participation of officers in politics represents a factor of diminishing professionalism and professional competency and is a source of interprofessional divisions (Huntington, 1994: 71).

Although there is almost universal consensus that the Western democracies built an effective, well balanced control over the military, it would be too presumptuous to draw the conclusion that all the challenges have ceased to exist and there is no need for further consideration and possible improvement of civil-military relations. Like any other organization, a military organization presents a dynamic organism and the civil-military relations are thus subject to a certain kind of dynamism. Military organizations are changing over time, in response to changing conditions. The key factors influencing the transformation of the military profession are: the growing importance of the role of technology, the weakening of social isolation of the military due to amassing of the armed forces and due to the modeling of deterring strategies in the nuclear era. These changes, which have occurred mainly in the second half of the 20th century, have resulted in the weakening of the boundaries between the military and civil society and they set targets for the military organization to participate more actively in the broader social context with the imperative to maintain the autonomy, competence and group cohesion (Smerić, 2005: 200-201).

There is an evident increase in the convergence of military and civilian institutions, and a more powerful intertwining of military and civilian sectors of society, due to a technological and organizational revolution. Complex consequences of this process reflecting on the characteristics of

[1] «At the highest level, generals and admirals are inevitably politicians in uniform, who spend more time in the political arena, rather than on the battlefield. » (Hague, Harrop, Breslin, 2001: 379)

the military organization Janowitz called "civilianization" (Janowitz, 1974.). It is the result of technological development of the complex machinery of warfare, which has weakened the line distinguishing military and non-military organizations and, therefore, the military establishment is increasingly showing characteristics typical of any large organization.[2]

No doubt that through such intertwining of military and civilian spheres the control of the military faced new challenges. If there is no longer such a clear distinction between military and civilian, how is it possible to set up an effective control over the military? On the other hand, some theorists, in the manner of Samuel P. Huntington warn that military organizational authority is now compromised by social marginalization of the Armed forces (in areas of "post-military" societies without war), despite the strengthening of their operational capabilities. This is done through a redefinition of the old and the emerging of new "non-traditional" military tasks, reducing the autonomy of action (caused by building and strengthening of global norms and powerful transnational movements and institutions) and the transformation of the Armed forces from the organization that "personifies" the state, to being the one of the actors among many who require the allocation of state resources. This way military organization loses its exclusivity in its relations with the state. Certainly, these are not contradictory processes but processes that exist parallely. Democratic societies are confronted with a very ambivalent processes and warnings: radical liberals will, in the interweaving of military and civilian roles and tasks see creeping, almost imperceptible militarization of society, while the advocates of radically exclusive military professionalism will see the elements of "eroding" of military professionalism and degradation of unity of the military profession (the weakening component of officers being oriented towards expertise in the "management of violence" - combat-oriented - and to the growing technical, administrative and techno managerial component) while the allocation of new "non-traditional tasks" to the Armed Forces on the one hand will be interpreted as an expression of a dynamic environment, and in a way just indicated the ability of the Armed Forces to answer to changes in their environment with necessary structural and functional adaptations while, on the other hand, it would be perceived as a way to marginalize the mMilitary.

Eastern European Transition

When considering the established model of civil-military relations and the overall elements of what we call defence policy framework, the dominant type of political culture is a factor of critical importance. Although it is changing over time, these changes are very slow and gradual. Numerous sources are having an influence on the creation of a dominant type of political culture, but the biggest impact probably lays in the historical heritage and the key processes in different segments of society.

If we look at the European post-communist sphere, in general, the political culture is not marked with the willingness or the motivation to compromise. It unavoidably lead to a "zero-sum game" in which the gain on the civilian part means a loss on the military side and vice versa. Compromise was not

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[2] Christopher Gibson and Don Snider investigated the dynamics of civil-military relations in the United States, focusing on the decision-making process. They showed that the Armed Forces have a large capacity to participate at the highest levels of decision-making, and a growing experience in political decision-making (Gibson, Snider, 1999). This is also the case in Latin America. The Armed Forces are not only taking over new missions that are predominantly of a civilian nature, but are also enhancing their ability to influence government decisions in other areas and departments. Latin American countries are a good example that shows an increased level of involvement of the military in the government decision-making process (Diamint 2003: 71).

perceived as a normal (and desirable) part of the political process, but as a weakness.[3] In order to introduce the political culture that generates compromise, the political system has to be based, on the one hand, on the rule of law and, on the other hand, on the broad consensus of fundamental values. For transition countries, in the area of civil-military relations this means that the restraint control (control by containment), should be gradually replaced by control of firm belief (control by conviction) (Lambert, 2009: 116). We could say that the transition to democratic institutions and values has been followed by problems on the military and on the civilian side as well. We will review some of the key issues which the area of civil-military relations in post-communist transition faces (Joó, 1995).

1.) The Lack of Appropriate Expertise in the Field Of Defence

A proper civilian expertise in security and defence matters did not almost exist in the early post-communist days. This applies equally to the communist party successors i.e., the reformed Communist Party and the Party of Democratic and liberal opposition. New Parties did not have the professional competence nor any experience in the field of defence and security. Moreover, parliamentarians, civil servants and officials, academics, journalists and others were not familiar even with the basics on when it comes to defence issues. At the beginning of the transition period, activities in this area were marked with what is commonly called the "demilitarization" of the defence sector and "civilianization" of defence policy and defence structures. However, this "civilianization" of the defence ministry sometimes had an extremely counterproductive effect. For example, this above mentioned effect shows the misunderstandings of civilian control and a conviction that civilians should have professional military knowledge, although it is clear that civilians within the Ministry of Defence do not exercise operational command and, therefore, do not represent a substitute for operational commanders. Expertise in the defence area is not the same as expertise in military affairs and in the execution of operational tasks. Civilian expertise and political control should not disrupt the area of professional military autonomy due to the risk of spillover of political and social conflicts into the military area and consequent weakening of the effectiveness of the military organization.

2.) The Absence of Credible Inputs from Civil Society and the Electorate

The interest of the society as a whole in defence issues is constantly on a very low level in most European post-communist states. Although the lack of interest is often explained by the presence of powerful liberal, anti-military, pacifist attitudes of the new generations with widely spread new lifestyles that have been rejected, the previously existing, traditional patterns and conservative values, which were considered to be imminent to a military organization, should be taken with certain skepticism. Specifically, the new, predominantly liberal values of a new era that are to a significant extent expressed in Western consolidated democracies do not lead to the same effect as is the case in post-communist countries. Moreover, while in the post-communist countries consolidated liberal tendencies are undoubtedly emerging in many areas, we are simultaneously seeing that strength is

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[3] It is understandable that the absence of compromise broadly characterized the social and political scene of most post-Communist countries, and this did not occur in the area of civil-military relations only. Due to the fact that civilian control over the military during the Communist regime was implemented using the penetration model, which meant a high level of politicization of the military and the militarization of society in post-Communist transition, the new political elite was particularly ruthless in the projection of its power in the area of civil-military relations, because it signified a great victory on the symbolical level. Ironically, as it happened for example in Poland, which had a dominant military power in Communism, the new post-Communist political elite was quite benevolent toward the old military elite, emphasizing the "patriotic Jaruzelsky motives", while in the countries where the Army quietly allowed the disintegration of the old Communist government and, thereby, enabled a bloodless path to democracy, as was the case in the Czech Republic or Hungary, the absence of any higher level of compromise was strongly shown.

being given to an extremely rigid, conservative and xenophobic attitudes and ideas. While no Western societies are exempted from such conflicting ideological positions, they are far more resistant to any attempts to challenge liberal democracy and its legacy and, therefore, rough reactions that come across are being rejected. The mMilitary organization in the Western societies has been liberated to a significant extent from bearing the conservative image of the patroness of traditional values and is increasingly starting to represent different values and ideological orientations that are a part of the society from which it has originated.

As a result, the indifference of the society regarding defence issues in the post-communist countries is to a large extent caused by the same reason that affects and produces the lack of appropriate expertise. The absence of civilian expertise is largely responsible for the fact that defence issues are rarely being articulated as relevant social issues, but are rather being treated as a budget issue.

3.) Lack of Understanding of the Concept of Civilian Control

In the post-communist period, a large number of new political actors are often facing the problem of how to maintain political neutrality when it comes to defence. Civilian control is perceived as the process of creating personally and politically loyal leading military personnel. Essentially, this process has retained the key features of penetration models of the previous period.

4.) The Lack of Experience in Working Together With Civilians

The first transition and reform challenge on the military side was particularly relevant in the interaction between the military and the highest managerial and / or supervisory levels in the ministries of defence and parliaments. Defence Ministries have been fully militarized institutions and civilian employees were mostly in support, technical and lower-paid positions. The military, therefore, was somehow reluctant to accept the new situation in which a civilian defence minister and civilians were both present in the defence department, which, up to then, had been exclusively military. However, in post-communist countries, the reluctance was more pronounced in terms of certain clumsiness and disorientation, and less in terms of deliberate obstruction. In general, the military has accepted the new situation relatively well. Admittedly, it was probably not the result of democratic beliefs in the military but of the real overview of the present situation. In fact, it was perfectly clear to the military that civilians do not, nor will soon have, the capacity which could effectively compete with the military expertise, and that despite the formal "civilianization" of the defence sector the actual extent of the civilian impact on defence issues would be rather small.

The problem of inexperienced soldiers working with civilian partners, their immediate superiors/officials, parliamentarians, etc. in high structures of the military or in the defence hierarchy showed a misbalance in defence expertise between soldiers and civilians. Regardless of this imbalance in defence expertise, and even if hidden intents of the military to maintain the highest possible level of influence in the defence would not transpire, this problem was clearly visible and went through various stages.

5.) Relative Isolation from Civil Society

The military has been far more intensely confronted with transition problems than it is the case with other social groups in a situation of adapting to new conditions brought about through pluralist democracy and a market economy. In the Communist society, the military was a closed society within

a closed society. Under these new circumstances, the military was supposed to come out of this sub-social context and enter the new open society. Its former relative social isolation made this change more difficult for the military than it was the case with other social groups. The military was faced with a completely new, unusual, and quite different position it went from a long period of being protected from public view to being exposed to critical media, public debates, judgment and assessment. For the first time, the military felt very vulnerable and did not have the answer how to protect itself. In addition, it had to acquire some new management and leading capabilities, which were previously not required. On the one hand, there was a need for acquiring ability/skills to communicate with the public and with civilian control and/or supervisory elite; on the other hand, it was necessary to develop defence management skills in the framework of budget constraints and to take the account of the overall social context at any time.

Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Modern Age

Studies of democratization and civil-military relations are usually being done separately. Those analyzing the world of democracy rarely dare to enter the world of the military, and if they do, they mention the military only briefly. Those who are involved within the military are generally concerned with security and defence issues and are excluding the broader political context of democracy.

In deliberation of civil-military relations it is necessary to shift the focus from military reform to the debate on democratic progress. Transition studies often show a sort of reduction when it comes to analysis of civil-military relations. In transitional states civil-military relations will be directed almost exclusively towards military reforms (in Eastern Europe it will be evaluated in terms of meeting the requirements of Euro-Atlantic integration processes) and the absence of threats will be perceived as evidence of an established subordination and of regime's democratic consolidation (primarily in Latin America). This brings us to the conclusion that the transitional states are facing only and exclusively issues belonging to the so-called "First generation" challenges from the area of civil-military relations, and that only the Western consolidated states can talk about the new challenges that appear in the postmodern era.

The "First generation" issues are related to the potential hazards of military Praetorianism. Consistently established legal framework of civilian control is generally considered to be an appropriate instrument for prevention of such threats (Lambert, 2009: 27). "Second generation" of challenges relates to the question of how generally defence policy is being managed. However, the conceptualization of defence policy management does not attract the attention of researchers such as is the case with a set of questions from the "first generation".

The "Second generation" problems in civil-military relations marked, in fact, a move of focus from "civilian control" and from the state to the broader societal aspects of the "democratic control", not only of the military but also of the number of security sector institutions and related activities. While the measures taken in the context of the "first generation" were mainly focused on the process of democratic transition and the establishment of effective political control over the military, the "second generation" measures are undertaking a far more ambitious task - to establish effective control mechanisms throughout the security sector, including developing and shaping defence and security policy. The "second generation" measures are determining the essentials for the process of democratic consolidation.

Socio-military relations are strongly influenced by major changes into the elements of social organization, general reorganization of the post-industrial societies and their positions and interconnections. The new era, formed by new societal paradigms such as pluralism, fragmentation, heterogeneity, disintegration, diffusion and ambivalence brought changes regarding the way the state uses the power, as well as in terms of citizen's loyalty. The current trends are fundamentally transforming the military structure, its culture and missions and thus civil-military and socio-military relations. The conditions of military training and its engagement are rapidly changing and the military is, therefore, faced with the social environment and cultural patterns on the one side and political demands on the other side and those factors are strongly eroding its identity and traditional characteristics. The disappearance of the traditional images of the soldier's job as a purely "male job", the introduction of private military corporations in the area that was considered to be the last monopolized area by a military organization, the dominance of military humanitarianism over conventional military action, etc. are just some examples of these changes.[4]

The problem of the transition states lies in the fact that they had to deal with the challenges of the "second generation" of civil-military relations, which had already swept Western consolidated democracies, while at the same time the "first generation" issues were not resolved.

The degree of speed and change in civil-military relations in transition countries has been determined by a limited number of qualified persons among the powerful party leaders, as well as by parliamentary and executive power, financial constraints and bureaucratic inertia. Different historical and cultural background, the dominant foreign economic ties, tying the political elite to the West or Russia, ideological and political manner of new (or new / old) political leaders - all this affects the different levels and styles change, not only in civil-military relations but in other areas of public life as well (Bebler, 1994).

Defence and Democracy: Conclusion

Although the focus should be shifted from military reform to the debate on democratic progress when considering civil-military relations, the reduction of the area of analysis of civil-military relations in transitional studies is very often the case. Thus, in transition countries, a deliberation on civil-military relations is directed almost exclusively toward military reforms (which are evaluated in terms of meeting the requirements of European integration). This would bring us to a conclusion that the transitional governments are faced only and exclusively with matters belonging to the so-called "First generation" challenges in the area of civil-military relations, and that only in the Western consolidated states it is possible to explore new challenges, known as the "Second generation" challenges that appear in the postmodern era. We have already shown that the essential characteristics of civil-military relations of post-communist transition is precisely that, the simultaneous presence of both generations' challenges.

It is necessary to understand civil-military relations in a much broader context than tie it to exclusively

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[4] Although the attitude that after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union peacekeeping and humanitarian missions replaced war is an exaggeration, some trends are undisputed and the data they confirm is very interesting. For example, in 1998 more civilian employees of the United Nations than, military personnel which operated under the UN flag (Moskos, 2000) were killed in Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions for the first time.

to the issue connected with ensuring political neutrality of the military that presents a "first generation" challenges in the field of civil-military relations. The real agenda of civil-military relations is the "Second generation" challenge that is related to a much broader framework and includes the establishment of effective control mechanisms throughout the security sector, which means designing and shaping defence and security policy. The "Second generation" challenges are crucial for the process of democratic consolidation.

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