

WHY STRATEGY HAS BEEN COMING OUT FROM SECURITY AND DEFENCE AREA?

Domjančić, Stjepan

Source / Izvornik: **ASYMMETRY AND STRATEGY ~ THEMATIC COLLECTION OF ARTICLES, 2018, 531 - 546**

Conference paper / Rad u zborniku

Publication status / Verzija rada: **Published version / Objavljena verzija rada (izdavačev PDF)**

Permanent link / Trajna poveznica: <https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:249:114266>

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Download date / Datum preuzimanja: **2025-01-31**

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**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA**

UNIVERSITY OF DEFENCE
STRATEGIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE
&
NATIONAL DEFENCE SCHOOL

ASYMMETRY AND STRATEGY

THEMATIC COLLECTION OF ARTICLES

Belgrade 2018

Published by
STRATEGIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE
&
NATIONAL DEFENCE SCHOOL

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ISBN 978-86-81121-17-7
(STRATEGIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE)

Co-Publisher
MEDIA CENTER “ODBRANA”

Library „Vojna knjiga“
Book no. 2189

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Cover Design
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Printed in
300 copies

Print
Vojna štamparija Beograd

ISBN 978-86-335-0594-9
(MEDIA CENTER “ODBRANA”)

ASYMMETRY AND STRATEGY

~ THEMATIC COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ~

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WHY STRATEGY HAS COME OUT FROM SECURITY AND DEFENCE AREA?

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Abstract: Contrary to the impression that the interest in strategic defence and security issues has increased; state institutions, armed forces, international organizations and similar entities are increasingly involved in conceptualizing security and defence strategy, this paper shows that the essence is actually the opposite. The process of fleeing from the strategic level of consideration of the problem. This tendency is well recognized by analysing concepts related to security and defence strategy. The notion of asymmetric warfare is so ambivalent that it has become unusable, and the situation is even more absurd with the concept of hybrid warfare. The terms have become a means of legitimating, political classification and not analytical tools. Different terms are not used to distinguish between different phenomena, to describe them more accurately and to explain them, but to make a certain appearance politically marked and thus determine how we ought to be treated as a state and society.

As defence and security issues begin to dominate in public and political discourse, scientific, expert, critical approach to these topics is reduced. Defence and security have definitely become daily political issues and have become problematic for military professionals. Strategic thinking in the area of security and defence is equally endangered and suppressed on the one hand by political voluntarism, irrelevant and arbitrary daily political influence, and, on the other hand, of the strategic surrogate offered in the form of simplicity, linearity, symmetry and mathematical accuracy.

Key words: strategy, security, defence, symmetric warfare, hybrid warfare.

INTRODUCTION

In spite of the fact that there are plenty of definitions of the term “strategy” which can sometimes be completely in contrast to each other - so we can actually state it is essential to clearly indicate its meaning for the

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necessary level of understanding of the meaning of the word in the context in which it has been used; the first association that crosses our mind when we hear the word “strategy” is most probably in the area of security and defence. The reason for it lies in the fact that the term “strategy” draws its origin from the military organization, and then it spread to all the other areas of functioning⁸¹³. However, even the positioning of the term “strategy” in the security/defence/military sphere will not contribute much to achieving its clarity and definition, but will stay characterized with the great level of ambivalence. Moreover, it can be claimed that the use of the term “strategy” in various fields in which it was “imported” has the higher level of clarity and consistency than it has in its original area. Could we here draw the conclusion that the military forgot what the strategy is or perhaps that the strategy we are used to in the security department became inadequate for it? The answer to this question is neither simple nor unambiguous. In order to answer this question, the term that has often been used lately - “symmetry”, i.e. “asymmetry” will be introduced in the analysis. Although we may have the impression there is increased interest in the strategic questions in the area of defence and security, and that the government institutions, military structures, international organizations and similar entities increasingly deal with conceptualizing the strategy in the area of security and defence, it is actually about avoiding the strategic level of the problem analysis.

SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY IN WARFARE

In encyclopaedias, asymmetry warfare is usually defined as the war between the clashed sides whose relative military power, i.e. strategy or tactics considerably differs. It is most often connected with the warfare between the unequal adversaries when the smaller or weaker forces have to use terrain, time, surprise or certain weaknesses of the bigger and stronger opposing forces in order to win or to achieve their strategic goals.⁸¹⁴

Asymmetric warfare is seen as unconventional approach mostly based on asymmetry between the opponents. That asymmetry implies that one side, due to its own weaknesses or strength of the adversary, is not capable of confronting the opponent conventionally. For that reason, the weaker side uses unplanned and unexpected weapons and tactics (relying on the surprise

⁸¹³ See more in: Domjančić, S., Gracin, D. *Kako promišljati strategiju u području sigurnosti i obrane?* Polemos, Vol. XIX, No. 37, Zagreb, 2017

⁸¹⁴ Lerner, K.L. *Asymmetric Warfare*. <http://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/asymmetric-warfare>

element), which could distract or reduce predominance of the enemy.⁸¹⁵ The recent literature suggests war in Afghanistan as a school example of the asymmetrical conflict. Asymmetrical warfare is also treated as a new method, not as a new way of warfare. Within this, the new method can also be used in the so-called traditional areas of military performance (high intensity of conventional conflicts), as well as in the new areas of military engagement (fight against terrorism, fight against organised crime, post-conflict stabilisation etc.).⁸¹⁶

All of these above and more other perceptions of asymmetry in military activities, i.e. asymmetrical warfare, derive from the simple and very admirable distinction between symmetry and asymmetry, traditional and new, conventional and unconventional, regularity and chaos, linearity and ambivalence, etc. However, the right question is: Has the symmetry, linearity and regularity ever existed in war? Isn't our symmetrical way of looking at things or explanation of particular warfare just an endeavour of its systematization? Hasn't that symmetry arisen from our attempt to simplify very complex and multi-dimensional elements that make the mosaic of war? Given the fact that many papers deal with "asymmetrical warfare" and asymmetry is referred to as considerably wide spectrum of the observed elements – asymmetry in the size and strength of the adversary, asymmetry in the political and social establishment, asymmetry in the war methods, asymmetry in defining political and/or military goals etc. – it is impossible today as it was in the past, to find the symmetrical conflict. Each and every conflict, that is to say, warfare in some or in majority of elements has the asymmetrical characteristics. If we narrowed the observed variables of certain warfare from the aspect of conducting warfare and then took it as criteria of symmetry, even then, we would not significantly reach a higher level of clarity. For instance, the World War I is very often cited as an example of conventional, symmetrical war. Nevertheless, if we look at the WW I battles, the very first shallow analysis will show that even there, most elements were not symmetrical. It is the opposite! And while the western battlefields still contained some elements (conditionally speaking) of traditional, positional warfare, the eastern battlefields were completely different.

⁸¹⁵ Brzica, N. *Asimetrični rat u Afganistanu i protupobunjeničke strategije*, Polemos, Vol. XV, No. 30, Zagreb, 2012

⁸¹⁶ Barić, S. *Vojne strategije i asimetrično ratovanje*, National Security and the Future, 4(11), Zagreb, 2010

ASYMMETRICAL, HYBRID AND SPECIAL WARFARE –
ANALYTICAL TOOL OR POLITICAL ATTITUDE?

Asymmetrical warfare, depending on the author or the context, includes wider or narrower spectrum of elements, but today it is considered to include particularly wide approach to understanding conflicts, in which wide range of resources, from political, economic, military to propaganda is being used, and the answer to the threat or intention of the threat of one side towards the other one, is not “symmetrical”. Symmetry has, therefore, become such an extensible term that it cannot be used in serious analyses because it is not clear what “*differentia specifica*” is. Inflation of the other emerging terms contributes even more to this absurdity. Hybrid warfare is used in terms of strategy, military strategy, military doctrine, format of warfare, method of warfare, etc. However, regardless of the chaos of various terms and indifference of the terms strategy, military strategy or doctrine, there is still something that connects all the definitions, approaches and efforts to explain what hybrid warfare is. Their bond is in the fact that the strategy/doctrine/format/kind consolidates conventional and unconventional (non-conventional, irregular, asymmetric) and cyber warfare; it largely uses propaganda resources, information and misinformation; it aims to cause the chaos; it raises the dissatisfaction within the population; it tries to destabilise the governance and so on. The term “special warfare” covers all of these things and this term has been used decades before insisting on the term “hybrid warfare”. Special war is most frequently defined as a set of organised and coordinated political, economic, psychological-propaganda activities of a certain country. It is aimed against another country, separatist movement, political organization or social group in order to impose their own interests by interfering in the existing political, economic and social relations. Various forcible measures and methods are being used for this purpose, including the limited use of military power, and usually the action of special and paramilitary forces. In accordance with this, special warfare is the hidden form of aggression or the introduction to the armed aggression. The goals and assets of the special war are decided and defined by the highest state political leadership. They are not made public; instead, they are attempted to be hidden by the general ideological and political slogans, and in most of the cases, their aims are achieved by the combination of different activities. The events before World War II are considered to be the inception of the special warfare. Nazi Germany had a leading role here. Before the beginning of the open military aggression, it ran the intensive psychological-propaganda and economic campaigns. Nevertheless, as a completely developed concept, special warfare reached the point of its highest development in 1960s, afloat the East-West

bipolarization and cold war conflict. The superpower used this type of warfare for frequent changes of political regimes in the third world countries (usually through various forms of military strikes) in order to establish desired political regime. If such methods were not effective, the countries in which a special war was led were exposed to destabilization, causing economic, political, ethnic or religious crises.⁸¹⁷

Just look at the newspapers of different countries and pay attention to the statements of political leaders to see how the use of a particular term has become a political expression. In NATO and the EU community, the term hybrid warfare is primarily reserved for Russian actions. The concept of hybrid warfare is far more dominant in the general political discourse than it is the concept of asymmetric warfare that will be used more by military structures. In the countries of the former Yugoslavia, regardless of NATO and/or EU membership, the concept of a special war dominates over the general political level.⁸¹⁸ What is surprising about it is the similarity of patterns used once in Yugoslavia and today in new independent states. The protagonists of special war are determined by political and ideological criteria; so-called the “fifth column” has been demonized and associated with the enemy from the outside; national unity has been advocated because enemy forces are everywhere; media and non-governmental organizations have been accused of non-patriotic behaviour, etc.

The terms have become a means of legitimation, political classification and not analytical tools. Different terms are not to distinguish between different phenomena, to describe them more accurately and to explain them, but to make a certain appearance politically marked and thus determine how we ought to be treated as a state and society.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY AS A DAILY POLITICAL ISSUES

As defence and security topics begin to dominate in public and political discourse, the scientific, professional, critical approach to these topics is reduced. Recently, we have witnessed a revival of interest shown for military and defence issues. This phenomenon can be observed on two levels, globally and nationally. However, the increased public interest reflects daily

⁸¹⁷ Hrvatska enciklopedija, on-line edition, Leksikografski zavod „Miroslav Krleža“, Zagreb (www.enciklopedija.hr)

⁸¹⁸ The notion of a special war, both at doctrinal and political level, was largely used in the former Yugoslavia. At that time, numerous publications on the special war were also published. At that time, the special war dominantly dealt with potential threats from the inside, the dangers of destabilization of the political order and the activities of emigrant groups.

political inputs; it is not the result of substantial changes in the attitude of citizens towards the formulation and implementation of public policies, or increased awareness of the problems of modern societies. Such an increase in the public interest is generally inversely proportional to the relevance of the topic involved.⁸¹⁹ The main reason for this is found in over-simplification of the issues and their arbitrary and superficial contextualization.⁸²⁰

Defence and security have definitely become daily political issues, and thus have become problematic for military professionals. As the area of strategy has become dominantly political area, resistance and/or disorientation of the military in the new circumstances can be seen as an escape from the strategy.

The classic military story about the ambiguously and inconsistently defined political/strategic guidelines by the military expects from political establishment represents the central point of every consideration of military-political relations. Let us just remember Moltke⁸²¹ and his views on the relationship between military and political aspect. Moltke thought that politics might be neglected when hostilities begin. He believed that politics could not be seen apart from the strategy. He agreed with the view that the strategy is closely related to the demands and conditions defined at political level, but the operations must be guided without regard to politics. Politicians are responsible for the strategy at the time of peace, while soldiers are responsible for military actions in the war.⁸²²

Moltke believes that politics uses war to achieve its goals. Politics decisively affects the beginning and end of the war. Where the strategy serves the politics better and works ultimately for the achievement of the goals of politics, it is entirely independent of politics in its actions. Military considerations are crucial for the course of war. On the contrary, political considerations are decisive only if they do not require something impossible from the military point of view. Moltke considered that politics could use its victories, because it was not its matter; the use of victory or defeat is the exclusive right of politicians.⁸²³

⁸¹⁹ Domjančić, S. *Civilno-vojni odnosi i tranzicija*, Despot infinitus Zagreb, 2015

⁸²⁰ Domjančić, S., Gracin, D. *Kako promišljati strategiju u području sigurnosti i obrane?* Polemos, Vol. XIX, No. 37, Zagreb, 2017. p. 103

⁸²¹ Helmuth von Moltke (1800th to 1891st) was a German field marshal. He was the head of the Prussian General Staff for thirty years. He was one of the greatest military strategists of the second half of the 19th century. Usually in the literature, he is known as Moltke the Elder, to distinguish him from his nephew.

⁸²² Domjančić, S. *Ratovanje u 21. stoljeću – postmoderna ili povratak u 19. stoljeće*. Polemos, Vol. XV, No. 30, Zagreb, 2012. p. 102/103

⁸²³ Vego, M. N. *Joint Operational Warfare – Theory and Practice*. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 2009

As much as this Moltke's point of view today sounded anachronistic, it is in its essential elements quite strong. At the root of Moltke's doubt on the political involvement in leading the war is mistrust in the ability of politicians to understand the field of military expertise. "Give us clear and unambiguous political guidelines, let us do the job, and then do what you want with our results!" So, that Moltke's message could simply be expressed to politicians. However, the military sends this type of message today, as well.

Speaking about the operational level today, we can simply say that it is the area between strategy and tactics (no matter how banal it may be). For example, today the US military⁸²⁴ try to create an operational level as a policy-free zone where military expertise is unlimited and in which military returns the conduct of the war under its control. The desire of the soldiers: politicians to be focused on policy and strategy, leaving soldiers to run the war.⁸²⁵ The military wants to focus on the operational level of the war, which it considers to be its real professional area. They try to avoid strategy because strategy has become area of the strong interference of "civil" elements with classical military elements; because of the constant emphasising on new "non-military" abilities, new players in the exclusive military arena. The military sees the operational level as the last refuge of military autonomy and military expertise. On the one hand, military tries to protect its professional autonomy, and, at the same time, protect traditional and already obsolete conception of political-military relations. On the other hand, it is about classic strategy misunderstanding.

The strategy represents a higher level of abstraction, which must be conceptually derived through theory. The theory allows us to visualize what we cannot see. Our theories allow us to visualize the terrain we do not see (for example, geographic maps). We cannot "see" abstract theory; we can only theoretically visualize it. Since we can see tactical action well, it has become a natural way to fight against strategic abstractions.

Most of the thinking about strategy shows lot of misunderstanding of strategy. Strategy is the art of creating a creative logic that will rationalize violence or competitive behaviour. The strategy deals with creating the rules of the game rather than playing the game.

Strategic thinking and action for the military should not only represent the higher level of tactical or operational area, but their precondition and

⁸²⁴ It should be emphasized that this is in a very similar way related to other militaries. We specifically mention the American military because its engagement is most visible on a global scale; the operations being carried out are widely known and analyzed the most.

⁸²⁵ Domjančić, S. *Ratovanje u 21. stoljeću – postmoderna ili povratak u 19. stoljeće*. Pemos, Vol. XV, No. 30, Zagreb, 2012. p. 103

starting point. The strategy does not give directions to operational or tactical commanders, but provides the idea of a whole “game”. In the 19th century, a fairly distinct separation between the “great strategy” and the military strategy was visible, because the content of each of them was fundamentally different. The military strategy did not address “non-military” aspects of national power. The military, beyond its organizational boundaries, was only interested in using the capacity of society to carry out military operations. The military strategic aspect of the military was almost exclusively *military* aspect.

The twenty-first century faced a military with a completely new situation. The boundary between the military and civil society was blurred. The task of more active participation in a wider social context and, at the same time, to maintain relative autonomy, competence and group cohesion has become very demanding for military organization.⁸²⁶ Convergence is on the increase of the military and civilian institutions and increasingly powerful permeation of the military and civilian sectors of the society, due to technological and organizational revolution. Janowitz has named the complex consequences of that process for the feature of the military organization civilianization. It is a result of the technological development of the complex machinery of warfare that has weakened the line of distinguishing between military and non-military organizations. Military establishment has been increasingly showing features that are characteristic for any big organization.⁸²⁷ Military organization loses its exclusivity in relations with the state institutions. The military, which earlier expressed its expertise in the “management of violence”⁸²⁸, whose expertise, along with corporate identity and professional autonomy, was the main tool to build authority in relations with the state and society, today needs to prove its expertise. The military no longer deals with the non-military aspects to support the achievement of military goals, but military goals aligns with non-military goals; military capabilities are required to be more civilian than military, a soldier is required to be a diplomat, humanitarian, ecologist, and sociologist. As these appearances and tendencies are more noticeable at a strategic level, the military is trying to “protect” its traditional image, so they escape to the operational level as a policy-free zone.⁸²⁹

⁸²⁶ Smerić, T. *Sparta usred Babilona. Sociologijski aspekti vojne profesije*. Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada. Zagreb, 2005

⁸²⁷ Janowitz, M. *The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait*. New York- London: The Free Press-Collier Macmillan, 1974

⁸²⁸ Huntingtonsterm

⁸²⁹ Domjančić, S. *Ratovanje u 21. stoljeću – postmoderna ili povratak u 19. stoljeće*. *Polemos*, Vol. XV, No. 30, Zagreb, 2012.

STRATEGY - ESCAPE FROM THE ROOT

In addition to this, the escape from the strategic level of consideration of security and defence issues is evident in the misunderstanding of the concept of strategy. Narrow understanding of the strategy has become substitute for a broad, conceptual understanding. It has been mentioned earlier that the concept of strategy draws its origin from the military organization and has therefore entered into all other areas. However, since the mid-twentieth century, the understanding of the business-oriented strategy increasingly enters the military, defence and security sectors, and such understanding of the strategy becomes more dominant and wider than traditional, original understanding. While, for example, the general, grand strategy has been linked to the area of national security and identifying key long-term oriented interests and goals, new, business-oriented security strategies are more linked to short-term achievable goals, primarily related to budget planning and execution. As the strategy in the business sector is dominated by the market position and the possibility of increasing profits, it will emphasize in its articulation the measurability of achieving the objectives (increasing market share, increasing exports, productivity growth, cost reduction, growth of profits etc.). By translating the tools developed within such a concept of strategy, defence and security (or general public administration) is reduced to all those aspects that cannot be expressed numerically. One of the outcomes of such a situation is the adjustment of the goals in a way that is not exclusively related to the financial or material aspect, but yet to be measurable. In such attempts, goals, or indicators of achievement of goals are created in such a way that they are measurable, but insufficiently relevant or even irrelevant. For example, if the goal is raising the level of awareness in the society about the dangers of terrorism, the indicator of achieving that goal is the number of advertisements paid in the media or the number of public forums organized by a state institution. Alternatively, for example, the goal is to contribute to international security, and as an indicator of the achievement - the number of people participating in an international mission, etc.⁸³⁰

The difficulty of defining a strategy is that it, even in this context, has different meanings for different people in the organization. Some consider the strategy to be high-level plans, which are framed by the governing structure. Others argue that the strategy rests on specific and detailed activities that are being undertaken to achieve the desired future. Thirdly, the strategy is the

⁸³⁰ Domjančić, S., Gracin, D. *Kako promišljati strategiju u području sigurnosti i obrane?* Polemos, Vol. XIX, No. 37, Zagreb, 2017.

same as the best practice, while for some it is a pattern of consistency of activity over time.⁸³¹ It is quite understandable that the understanding of the strategy will be multiplied if we understand the defence and security strategy beyond the limits imposed by the logic of the business world.

The problem with the strategy in the public sphere in general, as well as in the field of defence and security, is the necessity of articulating the strategy in a wider, conceptual sense and, at the same time, in narrower, planning, business sense. Conceptual concept of the strategy must precede the narrower and the latter must arise from the first. It is not therefore a matter of replacing one strategy with another, but setting up a hierarchical relationship between them.

One of the fundamental differences between the strategies within the public domain and the strategies within the business sector is in their essentially different scope. While in the business sector this scope is imposed by itself, and it is, as a rule, the organization, the current or desired activity of that organization or stakeholders, in the public domain this scope is not so clear and unambiguous, and interested stakeholders are stretched to the whole society. For example, the strategy of healthcare development, education, or traffic in a society is not just about employees in these sectors, nor just institutions that work in these social areas, but also, almost every major intervention in one of these areas has implications for another or requires adjustments in another area. Although business sector strategies may have significant implications for society, the level of their social responsibility is significantly lower. It is not a social responsibility to direct those strategies, but the interests of stakeholders, while social responsibility will be something that will be imposed on them through state institutions or social regulatory mechanisms.⁸³²

Due to the above reasons, the strategy for the business sector is much more similar to the action plan. Its goals are simple and unambiguous, very exact and measurable. With the real strategy, things are much more complicated. Extents of security and defence strategy cannot be limited to a group of people, organization or financial effects. The real security strategy does not involve armed forces, training or armaments, but the society as a whole and the numerous interactions between different segments of society and, at the same time, it has implications for security and defence. Real strategic thinking requires a creative and critical approach. Ignoring a real

⁸³¹ Niven, P. R. *Balancedscorecard: Korak po korak: Maksimiziranje učinka i održavanje rezultata*. Zagreb: Poslovni dnevnik: Masmedia, 2007. p. 115.

⁸³² Domjančić, S., Gracin, D. *Kako promišljati strategiju u području sigurnosti i obrane?* Polemos, Vol. XIX, No. 37, Zagreb, 2017.

strategy and simplifying strategic issues to the level of business plans is reflected in the aforementioned artificially generated symmetry of understanding.

ENDS, WAYS, MEANS – A SALUTARY FORMULA FOR THE STRATEGY?

In the last couple of years, the American military leaders constantly emphasize the need to further develop the skills of those leaders with the prominent critical and creative way of thinking. Their skills would ensure the United States to remain the most dominant power in the years or decades to come. Those endeavours imply that the American defence sector did not really succeed to achieve that goal in the last fifteen years. General Martin E. Dempsey, former American Chief of the Joint Staff emphasized with particular regard the need to develop agile and adaptable leaders with prominent values, with the strategic vision and critical way of thinking. The current Chief of Staff, General Joseph Dunford said there was no alternative to those leaders who recognize the implications of the new ideas, new technologies, and new approach as well as anticipate the effects of their appliance.⁸³³

There are two critical factors that cause the problems within strategy: the first one understands the strategy itself, and the other one is simplified understanding of the assets and resources. With pretty high amount of confidence, we could say that there is nothing we could say it is generally accepted or to say the least widely accepted theory of the strategy.⁸³⁴ Even in the United States, where most attention was paid to the research of this issue, we cannot find a word about official or generally accepted theory of the strategy. Moreover, there is no compliance about the question of what the theory of strategy should contain. It could be said that there are pieces of something that could be regarded as a theory, something that was set up in the framework of U.S. Army College: it is the model *ends, ways, means*⁸³⁵.

The abovementioned model starts with the problem about very broad, indefinite and ambivalent comprehension of the term “strategy”. Taking into account the fact that strategy is very often used as a general term for plan, concept or the course of the action, this model endeavours to narrow that definition. Here, the strategy is considered to be the area of interest and action

⁸³³ Meiser, J.W. *Are Our Strategic Model Flawed?*
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/.../10_Meiser.pdf.

⁸³⁴ Domjančić, S., Gracin, D. *Idem*.

⁸³⁵ Yarger, R. H. *Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model*, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/stratpap.htm>.

of the leaders at the top level of management: state, army, business corporation or any other institution, depending on the strategy. For instance, Henry Eccles describes the strategy as ... “comprehensive course of work on controlling the situation and the area of interest, so the goals could be achieved.”⁸³⁶ This leads to conclusion that several factors are critical for the strategy: it is comprehensive, it defines the course of action, its aim is to govern and it refers to the use of power. By applying the strategy on the state i.e. national interests, we could say that strategy is the use of instruments (elements) of power (political, diplomatic, economic, military, information) to achieve political goals of the state or perhaps to achieve them by competing with other actors.⁸³⁷

The interests are the end state, namely the survival, economic prosperity, the persistence of the national values. National elements of power represent the resources that are being used for promotion or enhancement of national interests. Strategy is the endeavour for accomplishment, protection or enhancement of those interests by applying the instruments of power. Hence, before anything else, strategy is a matter of choice. It reflects the preferences of the future situation or conditions. Despite its roots in the present state, if it is to be built on the realistic basis, it must be directed and aimed at future.

Strategy answers to the question of HOW (method or concept – *way*) the leaders will use the power (assets or resources – *means*) they have at disposal to manage the processes in order to achieve the goals (*aims*) which support the national interests. Strategy offers the course of activities in order to achieve it. Strategy is not crisis management. On the contrary, strategy is its polarity. Crisis management arises when there is no strategy or when strategy fails. The first premise of the theory of the strategy is: it needs to be proactive and anticipating.

The other premise refers to necessity to define the end state i.e. what we need to achieve by using the strategy.

In formulation of the strategy, *ends, ways and means* represent the whole completeness, so in case it is about the general big strategy at the national level with the end state defined for that particular level, *ways and means* for achieving the end state must also be referred to the concepts and resources at the national level. Therefore, *ends, ways and means* have to be mutually consistent⁸³⁸.

There is no doubt this kind of conceptualization of the strategy is pleasing in a certain way and attractive within its simplicity, linearity, the ease

⁸³⁶ Eccles, H. *Military Concepts and Philosophy*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1965. p. 48.

⁸³⁷ Eccles, H. *Idem*.

⁸³⁸ Yarger, R. H. *Idem*

of identifying the proximate cause, but in all of this we can find the biggest obstacle/trap. In this kind of comprehension of the strategy – creative way of thinking pays its price.

In the framework of *ends+ways+means* formula, the concept of so-called comprehensive approach (*or whole-of-government*) in solving the strategic problems, leads to overrating (overstressing) the use of resources - i.e. means. Simply, it does not matter what problem is about, just use all the elements of national power – diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, etc., and the problem will be solved. By using this approach, the strategic experts have just one more task to do – to create diagram in which every single element of national will be denoted as an endeavour aimed at adversary's centre of gravitation. By doing so, the experts are driven away from the creative and innovative way of thinking and primarily focused on the resources and power.⁸³⁹

Ends+ways+means formula is eventually reduced to the allocation of its resources, and that is not a strategy. However, in the modern behaviour of the states, organization, alliances, etc. exactly the same comprehension of the strategy dominates. By reviewing all the official web pages of the European and non-European states and various regional organizations, in the statements of the heads of states and governments, or ministers of defence or some other officials, it is easy to notice that defence and security strategy is directly and quintessentially connected with the increase of defence budget. Most of the states proudly announce the increased future defence budget as a proof of awareness for the security issues, and within that increased budget, the specifically emphasized part is the increase budget for modernization (armament and military equipment).

Ends + ways + means formula is so widely accepted that it can be argued that for modern strategists it has become what Einstein's formula $E = mc^2$ for physicists is.⁸⁴⁰

Understanding the strategy as a process of achieving balances between the desired end state and the means (*ends - means* relationship) is a very attractive simplification. However, such understanding of the strategy is only a different version of the question - How many soldiers should be deployed to the operation in order to achieve the goals? Such an approach to strategy has been very clearly seen by American strategists for the last fifteen years.⁸⁴¹ This approach ignores the main function of the strategy - what these soldiers need

⁸³⁹ Meiser, J.W. *Idem*, p. 82

⁸⁴⁰ Echevarria, A. J. *Op-Ed: Is Strategy Really a Lost Art?*, SSI, September 13, 2013, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.Army.mil/index.cfm/articles//Is-Strategy-Really-A-Lost-Art/>

⁸⁴¹ Perhaps the best example of this is the operation in Afghanistan.

to do in the operation; what their purpose is, or even better - what an alternative to sending these soldiers in operation is.⁸⁴²

Ends + ways + means formula and related concept of comprehensive approach actually leads to the transformation of strategy to resource-based discipline. Strategic, creative thinking is withdrawn and the planning of procurement and use of funds has become strategic surrogate. Strategies do not deal with a strategic issue - how to solve a security problem, but with resources. This problem is discussed only at a general, political level using uninventive doctrinal phrases of a comprehensive approach and hybrid threats. The political level does not give the strategic framework but only the political label in the function of political mobilization, justification or something else.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION - STRATEGY AS THE THEORY OF SUCCESS

Possible exit from this uninventive approach is, in the first place, to understand a strategy as a concept. The strategy cannot be considered too narrowly - for example, only through the prism of the use of the military element of power, or by the mechanical application of so-called comprehensive approach, which means a broad spectrum of elements, without any criticism.⁸⁴³ In Posen-Cohen's approach, this problem has been overcome by understanding the strategy as a theory of success.⁸⁴⁴ Defining a strategy as a theory of success stimulates creative thinking while at the same time keeping the focus on the analysis of causality with constant awareness of the ultimate desirable state. If we were to apply the Posen-Cohen model to Afghanistan, we could conclude that the process of adopting Afghanistan's strategy for US administration over the past period was deficient and problematic for at least two reasons: it was almost entirely based on means and just one option was seriously considered. The result can only be a bad strategy. The whole process of making a strategy has been limited almost exclusively to the question of how many soldiers to deploy to the operation and for how long. What was the second option?⁸⁴⁵ None! The question is, how you know that you have chosen the best option if no other is seriously considered.

⁸⁴² Meiser, J.W. *Idem*, p. 83

⁸⁴³ Meiser, J.W. *Idem*

⁸⁴⁴ Posen, B. *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986. p.13; Cohen, E.A. *Supreme Command Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime*, New York: Free Press, 2002. p. 33

⁸⁴⁵ Meiser, J.W. *Idem*

Strategic thinking in the field of security and defence today is equally threatened and suppressed on one side by the political voluntarism, irrelevant and arbitrary daily political influence and, on the other hand, by the strategic surrogates that are offered in the form of simplicity and uniformity, linearity, symmetry and mathematical accuracy.

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ZAŠTO JE STRATEGIJA IZAŠLA IZ BEZBEDNOSTI I ODBRANE?

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Apstrakt: Suprotno utisku da je interesovanje za strateška pitanja odbrane i bezbednosti povećano; da su državne institucije, oružane snage, međunarodne organizacije i slični entiteti sve više uključeni u konceptualizaciju strategije bezbednosti i odbrane, ovaj rad pokazuje da je suština zapravo suprotna. U toku je bekstvo od strateškog nivoa razmatranja problema. Ova tendencija je dobro prepoznata analizom koncepata vezanih za strategiju bezbednosti i odbrane. Pojam asimetričnog rata je toliko ambivalentan da postaje neupotrebljiv, a situacija je još apsurdnija u konceptu hibridnog rata. Pojmovi su postali sredstvo legitimizacije, političke klasifikacije, a ne analitičkih alata. Različiti izrazi se ne koriste za razlikovanje između različitih fenomena, da ih preciznije opisuju i objašnjavaju, već da naprave određenu politički obeleženu pojavu koju treba da tretiramo sa stanovišta države i društva.

Pošto pitanja odbrane i bezbednosti počinju dominirati u javnom i političkom diskursu, naučni, stručni i kritički pristup ovim temama se smanjuje. Odbrana i bezbednost definitivno postaju svakodnevna politička pitanja i time postaju problematična za vojne profesionalce. Strateško razmišljanje u oblasti bezbednosti i odbrane jednako je ugroženo i potisnuto s jedne strane političkim volonterizmom, nebitnim i proizvoljnim dnevnim političkim uticajem, a sa druge strane, strateškim surogatom ponuđenog u vidu jednostavnosti, linearnosti, simetrije i matematičke tačnosti.

Ključne reči: strategija, bezbednost, odbrana, simetrična borba, hibridni rat.

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