Prediktivni čimbenici ishoda pobuna: naučene lekcije

master's thesis

• Title (english): Predictive factors of insurgency outcomes: lessons learned
• Author: Jakov Marenić
• Mentor: Andrija Kozina (mentor)
• Mentor: Suzana Filjak (komentor)
• Committee member: Robert Mikac (predsjednik povjerenstva)
• Committee member: Andrija Kozina (član povjerenstva)
• Committee member: Suzana Filjak (član povjerenstva)
• Granter: University of Zagreb; (Croatian Defence Academy "Dr. Franjo Tuđman"); Zagreb
• Defense date and country: 2024-07-05, Croatia
• Scientific / art field, discipline and subdiscipline: SOCIAL SCIENCES; Security and Defense Science

Abstract

Ovaj diplomski rad bavi se pitanjem čimbenika koji utječu na uspješnost pobuna i problemom određivanja najuspješnijeg načina borbe protiv pobuna. Nakon pružanja teorijske podloge za razumijevanje pobuna i protupobunjeničkih operacija slijede tri studije slučaja. Prva proučava američki neuspjeh tijekom Vijetnamskog rata 1955.-1975. godine koji je bio uzrokovan pretjeranim oslanjanjem na vojna sredstva za rješavanje političkog problema. Sljedeća studija slučaja bavi se jednako neuspješnom intervencijom u Afganistanu. Koalicijske snage nisu uspjele poraziti talibanski pokret zbog svojeg nerazumijevanja složenih međuplemenskih odnosa u zemlji, nemogućnosti da unište talibanske baze u Pakistanu i nedostatka zajedničke strategije između afganistanske vlade i njezinih vanjskih partnera. Posljednja studija slučaja bavi se Malezijskom krizom 1948.-1954. godine u kojoj su britanske snage uspješno porazile pobunjenike tako što su ih odvojili od stanovništva na čiju su se potporu pobunjenici oslanjali. Studije slučaja potom su uspoređivane po operativnim čimbenicima vremena, prostora i snaga. Na temelju te usporedbe može se zaključiti kako uspjeh u protupobunjeničkim operacijama ovisi o prvenstvu političke dimenzije sukoba, odvajanja pobunjenika od stanovništva i o prekidu dovoda vanjske pomoći namijenjene pobunjeničkom pokretu.

Abstract (english)

This master's thesis deals with the issue of factors that influence the successfulness of insurgencies and the problem of determining the best course of action when fighting against insurgencies. The thesis will provide the theoretical basis neccesary for comprehending insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations, which will be followed by three case studies. The first will examine the American failure in the Vietnam War 1955-1975 which was caused by excessive reliance on military means in order to adress a political problem. The next study deals with the equally unsuccessful intervention in Afghanistan 2001-2021. The coalition forces were unable to defeat the Taliban movement because of their lack of understanding of the complex tribal relations in the country, their inability to destroy the Taliban bases in Pakistan and a lack of a common strategy between the government of Afghanistan and its foreign partners. The last case study deals with the Malaysian Emergency of 1948-1954, during which the British forces managed to defeat the insurgents by separating them from the population they depended upon. The case studies will then be compared using the operational factors of time, space and forces. Based on that comparison it can be concluded that success in counterinsurgency operations depends on the primacy of political means, the separation of insurgents and the population, and the curtailing of foreing aid being sent to the insurgent group.

• Keywords: pobune; prediktivni čimbenici; protupobunjeničke operacije; COIN
• Keywords (english): counterinsurgency operations; COIN; insurgencies; predictive factors
• Language: croatian
• URN:NBN: urn:nbn:hr:249:723964
• Study programme: Title: Military Leadership and Management; Study programme type: university; Study level: graduate; Academic / professional title: MAGISTAR/MAGISTRA VOJNOG VOĐENJA I UPRAVLJANJA (MAGISTAR/MAGISTRA VOJNOG VOĐENJA I UPRAVLJANJA)
• Type of resource: Text
• File origin: Born digital
• Access conditions: Closed access
• Created on: 2024-11-05 11:26:54